Abstract-Electronic passports (e-Passports) have known a wide and fast deployment all around the world since the International Civ il Aviation Organization (ICAO) the world has adopted standards whereby passports can store biometric identifiers. The purpose of biometric passports is to prevent the illegal entry of traveler into a specific country and limit the use of counterfeit documents by more accurate identification of an individual. The paper consider only those passport scenarios whose passport protocols base on public-key cryptography, certificates, and a public key infrastructure without addressing the protocols itself detailed, but this is no strong constraint. Furthermo re assume the potential passport applier to use ordinary PCs with Windows or Linu x software and an arbitrary connection to the Internet. Technological securities issues are to be found in several d imension, but below paper focus on hardware, software, and infrastructure as some of the most critical iss ues.
Introduction
A Passport is a document issued by a government to one of its cit izens that provides a means of authenticating the identity and nationality o f that citizen. A passport is an internationally recognized travel document that verifies the identity and nationality of the bearer. An electronic passport is a passport containing an electronic ch ip encoded with the information that is printed on the data page of the passport, as well as a digital picture of the passport holder to be used for biometric facial recognition, a unique chip number, and a digital signature of the data. The addit ion of the electronic chip is intended to provide additional resistance to forgery and, therefore, a stronger guarantee on the identity of the bearer. This improved security is also hoped to be accompanied with a faster processing time at border crossings.
The electronic passports have been successfully deployed in many countries around the world. Besides classical -paper‖ properties, these travel documents are equipped with an electronic ch ip emp loying wireless communicat ion interface, so-called RFID chip (Radio Frequency Identification). In addition to the electronic copy of the data printed in the passport (name o f the holder, birth date, photo, etc.), the ch ip may contain e.g. biometric measures of the holder and may employ sophisticated cryptographic techniques providing enhanced security compared to the classical passports. For instance, it should be much harder to copy an electronic passport compared the classical one.
The e-Passports create opportunities for States to enhance global civil aviation safety while at the same time imp roving the efficiency of aviation operations. The e-Passport can contribute to this because verification of the public key infrastructure certificates associated with e-Passports can provide border control authorities with an assurance that documents are genuine and unaltered, which in turn allo ws the bio metric informat ion contained in ePassports to be relied on to automate aspects of the border clearance process.
RFID ch ip has no conductive power contacts that would supply it with the energy, other means fro m the world of physics have to be borrowed. The power and the communicat ion channels employ the near magnetic field around the reader. For instance, when the chip needs to send information to the reader, it alters this surrounding field which is detected by the reader. Of course, if this modification is not properly filtered, unwanted informat ion about the behavior of the chip may propagate in the surrounding electro magnetic field, as well. Th is phenomenon is what cryptologists call a side channel. Electronic passports include contactless chip which stores personal data of the passport holder, information about the passport and the issuing institution. In its simp lest form an electronic passport contains just a collection of read-only files, mo re advanced variants can include sophisticated cryptographic mechanisms protecting security of the document and / or privacy of the passport holder. Its goal is to provide foolproof passport identification using a co mbination of biometrics and cryptographic security.
II. Literature Survey
Juels et al (2005) discussed security and privacy issues that apply to e-passports. They expressed concerns that, the contact-less chip embedded in an epassport allo ws the e-passport contents to be read without direct contact with an IS and, more importantly, with the e-passport booklet closed. They argued that data stored in the chip could be covertly co llected by means of -skimming‖ or -eavesdropping‖. Because of low entropy, secret keys stored would be vulnerable to brute force attacks as demonstrated by Laurie (2007) . Kc and Karger (2005) suggested that an e-passport may be susceptible to -splicing attack‖, -fake finger attack‖ and other related attacks that can be carried out when an e-passport bearer presents the e-passport to hotel clerks. There has been considerable press coverage (Johnson, 2006; Kn ight, 2006; Reid, 2006) on security weaknesses in e-passports. These reports indicated that it might be possible to -clone‖ an e-passport.
Multiple Biometric Systems
Limitations of unimodal b io metric systems can be overcome by using mu ltiple bio metric systems. A mu ltip le bio metric system uses multip le applications to capture different types of biometrics. This allows the integration of two or more types of biometric recognition and verification systems in order to meet stringent performance requirements. Such systems are expected to be more reliab le due to the presence of mu ltip le, independent pieces of evidence. These systems are also able to meet the strict performance requirements imposed by various applications [5] .
A mult iple system could be, for instance, a combination o f fingerprint verification, face recognition, voice verification and smart-card or any other combination of bio met rics. This enhanced structure takes advantage of the proficiency of each individual biometric and can be used to overcome some of the limitat ions of a single bio metric. For instance, it is estimated that 5% of the population does not have legible fingerprints, a voice could be altered by a cold and face recognition systems are susceptible to changes in ambient light and the pose of the subject's head. A mu ltip le system, which co mbines the conclusions made by a number of unrelated bio metrics indicators, can overcome many of these restrictions [3] .
Biometrics in passports
Bio metrics in e-passports complying with the ICAO specifications now provide for the optional inclusion of an encoded biometric to confirm the holder's identity, or other data to verify the document's authenticity. This makes possible an unprecedented level of document security, offering border control authorities a high level of confidence in the valid ity of travel docu ments. A biometric in a machine readable passport will only be able to contain informat ion of the passport holder, and no other additional person. Therefore, this section only covers the vulnerabilities of facial images, fingerprints, palm print and iris images.
Face Recognition
Face recognition are the most co mmon b io metric characteristic used by humans to make a personal recognition, hence the idea to use this biometric in technology. This is a nonintrusive method and is suitable for covert recognition applicat ions. The applications of facial recognition range fro m static ("mug shots") to dynamic, uncontrolled face identification in a cluttered background (subway, airport). Face verificat ion involves extracting a feature set fro m a two-d imensional image of the user's face and matching it with the template stored in a database.
The most popular approaches to face recognition are based on either: 1) the location and shape of facial attributes such as eyes, eyebrows, nose, lips and chin, and their spatial relat ionships, or 2) the overall (global) analysis of the face image that represents a face as a weighted comb ination of a nu mber of canonical faces. It is questionable if a face itself is a sufficient basis for recognizing a person fro m a large nu mber of identities with an extremely high level of confidence. Facial recognition system should be able to automatically detect a face in an image, extract its features and then recognize it fro m a general viewpoint (i.e., fro m any pose) wh ich is a rather d ifficult task. Another problem is the fact that the face is a changeable social organ displaying a variety of expressions [4] .
Fingerprint Recognition
A fingerprint is a pattern of ridges and furrows located on the tip of each finger. Fingerprints were used for personal identification for many centuries and the matching accuracy was very high. Patterns have been extracted by creating an in ked impression of the fingertip on paper. Today, co mpact sensors provide digital images of these patterns. Fingerprint recognition for identification acquires the initial image through live scan of the finger by direct contact with a reader device that can also check for validating attributes such as temperature and pulse. In real-time verification systems, images acquired by sensors are used by the feature extraction module to compute the feature values. as minutiae points. The matching process involves comparing the two-dimensional minutiae patterns extracted fro m the user's print with those in the template.
One problem with the current fingerprint recognition systems is that they require a large amount of computational resources [2] .
Palmprint Recognition
The palmp rint recognition module is designed to carry out the person identification process for the unknown person. The palmprint image is the only input data for the recognition process. 
Iris Recognition
Iris recognition technology is based on the distinctly colored ring surrounding the pupil of the eye. Made fro m elastic connective tissue, the iris is a very rich source of bio metric data, having appro ximately 266 distinctive characteristics. These include the trabecular meshwork, a tissue that gives the appearance of dividing the iris rad ically, with striat ions, rings, fu rrows, a corona, and freckles. Iris recognition technology uses about 173 of these distinctive characteristics. Iris recognition can be used in both verification and identification systems. Iris recognition systems use a small, high-quality camera to capture a b lack and wh ite, high-resolution image o f the iris. The systems then define the boundaries of the iris, establish a coordinate system over the iris, and define the zones for analysis within the coordinate system [9] .
Design of Biometric System
Five objectives, cost, user acceptance and environment constraints, accuracy, computation speed and security should be considered when designing a biometric system. They are inter-related, reducing accuracy can increase speed. Typical examp les are hierarchical approaches. Reducing user acceptance can improve accuracy. For instance, users are required to provide more samp les for training the system. Increasing cost can enhance security. More sensors can be embedded to collect different signals for aliveness detection. In some applicat ions, some environ mental constraints such as memory usage, power consumption, size of templates, and size o f devices have to be factored into a design. A bio metric system installed in a PDA (Personal Digital Assistant) requires low power and memory usage, but these requirements are not essential for access control. A practical b io metric system should balance all these aspects [7] .
III. E-Passport PKI Validation
E-Passport validation achieved via the exchange of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates is essential for the interoperability benefits of e-Passports to be realised.PKI validation does not require or involve any exchange of the personal data of passport holders, and the validation transactions help combat identity fraud. The business case for validating e-Passports is compelling. Bo rder control authorities can confirm that:
 The document held by the traveler was issued by a bonafide authority.
 The biographical and bio metric information endorsed in the document at issuance has not subsequently been altered.
 Provided active authentication and / or chip authentication is supported by the e-Passport, the electronic informat ion in the document is not a copy (i.e. clone).
 If the document has been reported lost or has been cancelled, the validation check can help confirm whether the document remains in the hands of the person to whom it was issued.
As a result passport issuing authorities can better engage border control authorities in part icipating countries in identifying and removing fro m circulation bogus documents. E-Passport validation is therefore an essential element to capitalize on the investment made by States in developing e-Passports to contribute to improved border security and safer air travel globally. Because the benefits of e-Passport validation are collective, cu mulat ive and universal, the broadest possible implementation of e-Passport validation is desirable [8] .
IV. Data Structure
A logical Data Structure (LDS) for e -passports required for global interoperability. It defines the specifications for the standardized organization of data recorded to a contactless integrated circuit capacity expansion technology of an M RP when selected by an issuing state or organizat ion so that the data is accessible by receiv ing states. This requires the identification of all mandatory and optional Data Elements and a prescriptive ordering and/or grouping of data elements that must be followed to achieve global For interoperability, the e-Passport specifies details on how the data should be stored in the microchip. The data elements are grouped together as a Data Group (DG) and collect ively stored in a Logical Data Structure (LDS). The data elements into 19 data groups and the LDS are categorized into two parts: Mandatory: Data defined by the issuing state or organization contains the details recorded in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) that include passport number, passport bearer's name, nationality, date of birth, date of exp iry, encoded facial b io metric image and a checksum of the individual data elements that are used to derive the session key.
Opti onal: Data defined by the issuing state or organization, contains optional biometric data for identification, such as, finger prints, palm prints, iris scans, displayed identificat ion data such as a digitized signature and any additional personal or document details, such as contact details, proof of citizenship and endorsements.
The data groups from one to 16 are defined by the issuing state and are writing protected, whereas the data groups for 17 to 19 will be open for write-access to authorized receiv ing states or organizations. Writeaccess is not supported in the first generation, but is available in the second generation of e-Passports. The LDS is stored in the microchip using the file system. The dedicated file (DF) in the chip file system hierarchy stores the encryption, the MAC keys used in basic access control protocol and the private key of the ePassport bearer that is used in active authentication protocol. The elementary file (EF) in the chip hierarchy will store the security object descriptors (SOD) and data groups. The SOD contains the hashes of the LDS data elements digitally signed by the issuing organization (document signer (DS)) and the corresponding certificate. An important security feature is that the data groups are individually hashed and collectively signed by the issuing state and stored in SOD, thus binding the biometric details with the e-Passport bearer details.
The PKI section of the ICA O's e-Passport document makes an important distinction between an issuing state and an issuing organization. The issuing state represents the country of e-Passport origin whereas the issuing organization represents a passport issuing office within a country [6] .
V. Implementati on of E-Passport System
In order to imp lement this internet passport authentication system using mu ltiple b io metric identification technology efficiently, ASP.NET program is used. This program could speed up the development of this system because it has facilit ies to draw forms and to add library easily. There are three ways of doing authentication and authorization in ASP.NET:
Bio metric authentication is the process of determining the authenticity of a user based on the user's credentials. Whenever a user logs on to an application, the user is first authenticated and then authorized. The application's web.config f ile contains all of the configuration settings for an ASP.NET application. It is the job of the authentication provider to verify the credentials of the user and decide whether a particular request should be considered authenticated or not. A bio metric authentication provider is used to prove the identity of the users in a system. ASP.NET provides three ways to authenticate a user: Forms Authenticati on: This authentication mode is based on cookies where the user name and the password are stored either in a text file or the database. After a user is authenticated, the user's credentials are stored in a cookie for use in that session. When the user has not logged in and requests for a page that is insecure, he or she is redirected to the login page of the application. Forms authentication supports both session and persistent cookies.
Windows Authentication: Th is is the defau lt authentication mode in ASP.NET. Using this mode, a user is authenticated based on his/her Windows account. Windows Authentication can be used only in an intranet environment where the ad ministrator has full control over the users in the network. Authorizat ion is the process of determining the accessibility to a resource for a p reviously authenticated user. Note that authorization can only work with authenticated users, hence ensuring that no unauthenticated user can access the application. The default authentication mode is anonymous authentication. 
Passport Authentication in Win HTTP

Passport Single Sign-In
Passport allows users to create a single sign-in name, password and biometric identification to access passport site that has implemented the Passport single sign-in (SSI) service. By imp lementing the Passport SSI, it won't have to implement user-authentication mechanism. Users authenticate with the SSI, which passes their identities to passport site securely. Although passport authenticates users, it doesn't grant or deny access to individual sites i.e. Passport does only authentication not authorizat ion. Passport simply tells a part icipating site who the user is. Each site must implement its own access-control mechanisms based on the user's Passport User ID (PUID). First user requests any page from his web server. Since user is not authenticated, passport web server redirects its request for authentication with Sign-In logo. When user presses Sign-In button, request will go to Passport server for Sign-In page. Once the Sign-In page comes to browser, user will enter h is authentication details like Passport ID, Password and biometric identification. When user credentials are submitted, Credentials are validated in Passport server. Then Cookies are created in server and response is send to the browser with encrypted query string. Now both cookies and query string is having details about authentication. Once user is authenticating, he will be taken to page which is requested first. The follo wing figure 2 shows Passport Application Chain. 
Initial Request
When a client requests a resource on a server that requires Passport authentication, the server checks the request for the presence of tickets. If a valid t icket is sent with the request, the server responds with the requested resource. If the t icket does not exist on the client, the server responds with a 302 status code. The response includes the challenge header, "WWWAuthenticate: Passport". Clients that are not using Passport can follow the redirection to the Passport login server. More advanced clients typically contact the Passport nexus to determine the location of the Passport login server. The following figure 3 shows the init ial request to a Passport affiliate.
Central to the Passport network is the Passport Nexus, which facilitates synchronization of Passport participant sites to assure that each site has the latest details on network configurat ion and other issues. Each Passport component (Passport Manager, Login servers, Update servers, and so on) periodically co mmunicates with the Nexus to retrieve the in formation it needs to locate, and properly co mmunicate with, the other components in the Passport network. Th is information is retrieved as an XM L document called a Co mponent Configuration Document, or CCD. 
Passport Login Server
The figure 4 shows the passport login server to a Passport affiliate. A Passport login server handles all requests for tickets for any resource in a Passport domain authority. Befo re a request can be authenticated using Passport, the client application must contact the login server to obtain the appropriate t ickets. When a client requests tickets fro m a Passport login server, the login server typically responds with a 401 status code to indicate that user credentials must be provided. When these credentials are p rovided, the log in server responds with the tickets required to access the specified resource on the server that contains the originally requested resource. The login server can also redirect the client to another server that can provide the requested resource.
Authenticated Request
When the client has the tickets that correspond to a given server, those tickets are included with all requests to that server. If the tickets have not been modified since they were retrieved fro m the Passport login server, and the tickets are valid fo r the resource server, the resource server sends a response that includes both the requested resource and cookies that indicate that the user is authenticated for future requests. The following figure 5 shows an authenticated request to the Passport login server.
The additional cookies in the response are intended to speed the authentication process. Additional requests in the same session for resources on servers in the s ame Passport Do main Authority all include these additional cookies. Credentials do not need to be sent to the login server again until the cookies expire.
Passport in Win HTTP
Win HTTP handles many of the transaction details internally for Passport authentication. During the init ial request, the server responds with a 302 status code when authentication is necessary. The 302 status code actually indicates a redirection and is part of the Passport protocol for backwards co mpatibility. Win HTTP hides the 302 status code and contacts the Passport nexus, and then the login server. The Win HTTP application is notified of the 401 status code sent by the login server to request user credentials. To the application, however, it appears as if the 401 status originates fro m the server fro m which the resource was requested. In this way, the Win HTTP application is unaware of interactions with other servers, and it can handle Passport authentication with the same code that handles other authentication schemes.
Typically, a Win HTTP application responds to a 401 status code by supplying authentication credentials. When credentials are supplied with WinHttpSetCredentials or Set Credentials for passport authentication, the credentials are actually being sent to the login server, not to the server indicated in the request. Once retrieved, tickets are managed internally and are automatically sent to applicable servers in future requests.
Win HTTP can successfully comp lete the Passport authentication even if an application disables auto redirection. However, after the Passport authentication is complete, an imp licit redirect must occur from the Passport login server URL back to the original URL. If an application has disabled automatic redirect ion, Win HTTP requires that the application give Win HTTP "permission" to redirect automatically in this special case.
VI. Internet Passport Protocol
To resolve the security issues identified in both the first-and second-generation of e-Passports, in this section, we present an on-line secure e-Passport protocol (OSEP protocol). The p roposed protocol leverages the infrastructure available for the standard non-electronic passports to provide mutual authentication between an e-Passport and an IS. Currently, most security organizat ions are involved in passive monitoring of the border security checkpoints. When a passport bearer is validated at a border security checkpoint, the bearer's details are collected and entered into a database. The security organization compares this database against the database of known offenders (for instance, terrorists and wanted criminals). The OSEP protocol changes this to an active monitoring system. The border security check-point or the DV can now crosscheck against the database of known offenders themselves, thus simp lifying the process of the identification of criminals.
Internet Passport Initial Setup
All entities involved in the protocol share the public quantities p, q, g where:
 p is the modulus, a prime number of the order 1024 bits or more.
 q is a prime number in the range of 159 -160 bits.
 g is a generator of order q, where Ai < q, g i ≠ 1 mod p.
 Each entity has its own public key and private key pair (PK i ,SK i ) where PK i = g (SK i ) mod p  Entity i's public key (PK i ) is certified by its root certification authority (j), and is represented as CERT j (PK i , i).
 The public parameters p, q, g used by an ePassport are also certified by its root certification authority.
Phase One -Inspection System Authentication
Step 1 (IS) When an e-Passport is presented to an IS, the IS reads the MRZ informat ion on the ePassport using an MRZ reader and issues the command GET CHA LLENGE to the ePassport chip.
Step 2 Step 3 (IS) On receiving the response fro m the ePassport, the IS generates a random IS £ R 1 ≤ IS ≤ q -1 and computes its part of the session key as K IS = g IS mod p. The IS dig itally signs the message containing MRZ value of the ePassport and K eP .
S IS = SIGN SKIS (MRZ || K eP )
It then contacts the nearest DV of the ePassports issuing country and obtains its public key. The IS encrypts and sends its signature S IS along with the e-Passport's MRZ information and K eP using the DV's public key PK DV .
IS → DV: ENC P K DV (S IS , MRZ, K eP ), CERT CVCA (PK IS , IS)
Step 4 (DV) The DV decrypts the message received fro m the IS and verifies the CERT CVCA (PK IS , IS) and the signature S IS . If the verification holds, the DV knows that the IS is genuine, and creates a digitally-signed message S DV to prove the IS's authenticity to the e-Passport.
The DV encrypts and sends the signature S DV using the public key PK IS of IS.
DV → IS: ENC PKIS (S DV , [PK eP ])
The DV may choose to send the public key of the e-Passport if required. This has an obvious advantage, because the IS system now trusts the DV to be genuine. It can obtain a copy of e-Passport's PK to verify during e-Passport authentication.
Step 5 (IS) After decrypting the message received, the IS co mputes the session key K eP IS = (K IS ) eP and encrypts the signature received fro m the DV, the e-Passport MRZ information and K eP using K eP IS . It also digitally signs its part of the session key K IS . IS → eP : K IS , SIGN SKIS (K IS , p, q, g), ENCK eP IS (S DV ,MRZ,K eP )
Phase Two -Internet Passport Authentication
Step 1 C The IS issues an INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE co mmand to the e-Passport. The e-Passport on receiving the command, the e-Passport creates a signature S eP = SIGN SKeP (MRZ || K eP IS ) and sends its domain parameter certificate to the IS. The entire message is encrypted using the session key K eP IS .
eP → IS : ENCK eP IS (S eP , CERT DV (PK eP ), CERT DV (p, q, g))
Step 2 (IS) The IS decrypts the message and verifies CERT DV (p, q, g), CERT DV (PK eP ) and S eP . If all three verifications hold then the IS is convinced that the e-Passport is genuine and authentic.
During the IS authentication phase, and IS sends the e-Passport's MRZ information to the nearest ePassport's DV, which could be an e -Passport country's embassy. Embassies are DV's because they are allowed to issue e-Passports to their citizens and because most embassies are located within an IS's home country, any network connection issues will be min imal. Sending the MRZ information is also advantageous, because the embassy now has a list of all its citizens that have passed through a visiting country's border security checkpoint. We do not see any privacy imp licat ions, because, in most cases, countries require their cit izens to register at embassies when they are visiting a foreign country.
VII. Experimental Results
The key application of a biometrics solution is the identity verification problem of physically tying an MRTD holder to the M RTD they are carrying. There are several typical applications for b io metrics during the enrolment process of applying for a passport:
The applicant's bio metric template(s) generated by the enrolment process can be searched against one or more bio met ric databases (identificat ion) to determine whether the applicant is known to any of the corresponding systems (for example, holding a passport under a different identity, criminal record, hold ing a passport from another state).
When the applicant collects the passport (or presents them for any step in the issuance process after the init ial application is made and the bio metric data is captured) their b io metric data can be taken again and verified against the initially captured template.
The identities of the staff undertaking the enro lment can be verified to confirm they have the authority to perform their assigned tasks. This may include biometric authentication to initiate d igital signature of audit logs of various steps in the issuance process, allo wing bio metrics to link the staff members to those actions for which they are responsible.
Each time traveler (i.e. MRTD holders) enters or exit a State, their identities can be verified against the images or templates created at the time their travel documents were issued. This will ensure that the holder of a docu ment is the leg itimate person to whom it was issued and will enhance the effectiveness of any Advance Passenger Information (API) system. Ideally, the biometric temp late or temp lates should be stored on Two-way check -The traveler's current captured biometric image data, and the bio metric template fro m their travel docu ment (or fro m a central database), can be matched to confirm that the travel document has not been altered.
Three -way check -The traveler's current bio metric image data, the image fro m their travel docu ment, and the image stored in a central database can be matched (via constructing biometric templates of each) to confirm that the travel document has not been altered. This technique matches the person, with their passport; with the database recording the data that was put in that passport at the time it was issued.
Four-way check -A fourth confirmatory check, albeit not an electronic one, is visually matching the results of the 3-way check with the digit ized photograph on the Data Page of the traveler's passport.
Besides the enrolment and border security applications of bio metrics as manifested in one-to-one and one-to-many matching, States should also have regard to, and set their own criteria, in regard to: Accuracy of the biometric matching functions of the system. Issuing States must encode one or more facial, fingerprint, palm print or iris bio metrics on the M RTD as per LDS standards (or on a database accessible to the Receiv ing State). Given an ICA O-standardized biometric image and/or template, Receiv ing States must select their own biomet ric verification software, and determine their own bio metric scoring thresholds for identity verificat ion acceptance rates -and referral of imposters.
VIII. Conclusions
The work represents an attempt to acknowledge and account for the presence on internet passport authentication system using mult iple b io metrics using face, fingerprint, palmp rint and iris recognition towards their imp roved identification.
The application of biometric recognition in passports requires high accuracy rates; secure data storage, secure transfer of data and reliable generation of bio metric data. The passport data is not required to be encrypted, identity thief and terrorists can easily obtain the bio metric informat ion. The discrepancy in privacy laws between different countries is a barrier for global implementation and acceptance of biometric passports. A possible solution to un-encrypted wireless access to passport data is to store a unique cryptographic key in pr inted form that is also obtained upon validation. The key is then used to decrypt passport data and forces thieves to physically obtain passports to steal personal information. More research into the technology, additional access and auditing policies, and further security enhancements are required before bio metric recognition is considered as a viable solution to biometric security in passports. The adversaries might exp loit the passports with the lowest level of security. The inclusion of b io metric identification informat ion into mach ine readable passports will imp rove their robustness against identity theft if additional security measures are implemented in order to compensate for the limitations of the biometric technologies. It enables countries to digitize their security at border control and provides faster and safer processing of an e-passport bearer. The main cryptographic features and bio metrics used with epassports and considered the surrounding procedures. E-passports may provide valuable experience in how to build more secure and biomet ric identification platforms in the years to come.
